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STILL LOOKING FOR AUDIENCE COSTS 
Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu 
 
Eighteen years after publication of James Fearon’s article stressing the importance of domestic 
audience costs in international crisis bargaining, we continue to look for clear evidence to 
support or falsify his argument.1 Notwithstanding the absence of a compelling empirical case for 
or against audience costs, much of the discipline has grown fond of Fearon’s basic framework. A 
key reason for the importance of Fearon’s claims has been the volume of theories that build on 
the hypothesis that leaders subject to popular rule are better able to generate audience costs. 
Scholars have relied on this logic, for example, to argue that democracies are more likely to win 
the wars they fight,2 that democracies are more reliable allies,3 and as an explanation for the 
democratic peace.4  
 A pair of recent studies, motivated largely by limitations in the research designs of 
previous projects, offers evidence the authors interpret as contradicting audience cost theory.5 
Although we share the authors’ ambivalence about audience costs, we are not convinced by their 
evidence. What one seeks in looking for audience costs is evidence of a causal mechanism, not 
just of a causal effect. Historical case studies can be better suited to detecting causal mechanisms 
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than quantitative methods, and these two studies claim to be examining causal mechanisms. Yet 
process tracing is much less effective in assessing audience costs than Trachtenberg and others 
believe. After outlining relevant problems, we encourage scholars to theorize about and test more 
carefully key micro-foundations of audience cost theory. 
<A>AUDIENCE COSTS: A MECHANISM, NOT AN EFFECT</A> 
Audience cost theory is best understood—and tested—as a theory about a causal mechanism. It 
is an argument about how X affects Y, rather than an argument about whether X affects Y.6 This 
makes the theory a particularly difficult one to test using standard research methods, quantitative 
and qualitative.7  
 Several researchers have attempted to test Fearon’s theory using time-series cross-
sectional statistical analyses of crisis behavior. This literature has demonstrated, for example, 
that democratic dyads engage in less intra-crisis activity,8 leaders of democracies are less likely 
to back down,9 signals of resolve improve the probability of a challenger prevailing in a crisis 
between democracies,10 and democracies are less likely to face resistance when they initiate 
disputes.11 
 Despite this evidence, quantitative tests of audience cost theory face at least four 
challenges. The first is potential endogeneity. Although research might establish, for example, 
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that democracies are more likely to exhibit certain advantages during crises, we generally cannot 
infer causality from this relationship, largely because states realize different types of regimes 
through decidedly nonrandom processes. Whatever causes democracy may itself be partly or 
wholly responsible for various desirable democratic attributes. Second, the data sets generally 
used to test audience cost theory may not be well suited to the task because they include many 
cases in which leaders make no threats.12  Third, this literature is primarily concerned with 
testing an implication of Fearon’s model, that is, that democracies fare better in certain crisis 
situations.13 Yet this implication largely rests on Fearon’s assumption that democracies have 
“stronger domestic audiences.”14 If this assumption is incorrect, then there is reason to doubt the 
specific processes posed in Fearon’s model, though we need not abandon the much more general 
audience costs mechanism. Evidence for or against a democratic advantage can be interpreted as 
direct support for or against this implication of Fearon’s argument, but it is not definitive with 
respect to the broader causal mechanism. Audience costs may matter, even if Fearon’s particular 
formulation is incorrect, if autocrats are also able to create and use audience costs for foreign 
policies.15  
 These problems can be overcome through careful use of data and methods,16 and by 
specifying hypotheses that directly test unique implications of theoretical models.17  A fourth 
problem is especially difficult: many statistical methods are not designed to test causal 
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mechanisms, including sophisticated tools designed for causal inference.18 These methods may 
establish that democracies can make more credible threats, but even so, we would not know 
whether this occurs through the creation of audience costs.19 Interaction terms can be used to 
assess whether two processes jointly contribute to a given effect. If the interaction X1 * X2 has a 
significant relationship with Y, we may infer that the effect of X1 on Y significantly increases or 
decreases with X2, suggesting that X2 is involved in the mechanism by which X1 affects Y. Such 
a design is useful for addressing this problem, but recent work suggests that it must be used with 
care: the extent to which interaction terms allow, such inference is frequently misunderstood, 
requires additional assumptions, and “provides only indirect evidence about a hypothesized 
causal mechanism.”20   
 The difficulty of testing causal mechanisms using quantitative methods is a key motivator 
behind recent attempts to test audience cost theory with historical case studies.21 Both 
Trachtenberg and Snyder and Borghard use forms of process tracing, in each case finding little 
evidence of the audience costs mechanism at work. Although advocates of these methods argue 
with some justification that process tracing is better suited for testing causal mechanisms, neither 
study makes a convincing effort to explain why the approach is appropriate in the context of 
audience costs.22 We acknowledge that carefully crafted case studies can help identify causal 
mechanisms in many instances, but we are skeptical about the extent to which process tracing 
can be used to uncover the audience costs mechanism.  
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 Audience costs are difficult to observe directly. Trachtenberg notes that quantitative tests 
are limited because “statistical inference deals with observables.”23 Yet case studies must also 
focus on observables. One might argue that case studies are useful for taking into account more 
observables than quantitative research (especially when observables are difficult to quantify), but 
case studies fare no better when taking into account unobservables. It is not clear how 
researchers should process trace nonevents, for example. Factors that are not readily observable 
include actors’ intentions, the extent to which actors are able to transmit information to others, 
and how observers perceive information.  
 Conclusions regarding whether the audience costs mechanism was employed often turn 
on analyses of leaders’ intentions when making key public pronouncements, such as those made 
by Lord Salisbury’s during the Fashoda crisis, Lloyd George during the Agadir crisis, and 
Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet these intentions are particularly difficult to distill. 
Primary sources can provide insight into leaders’ intentions, but concluding that a leader did not 
use a public address to create audience costs because there is not enough documentary evidence 
that he did so requires one to make untenable assumptions about both the documentation and 
leaders’ incentives. That a leader would clearly document his or her plans to use a public 
pronouncement to create audience costs is unlikely; a public that learned of a leader’s intentions 
would be less likely to play the role required of it by the theory.24 It might be said that the first 
rule of audience costs is that you do not talk about audience costs. Leaders may, at times, 
document such intentions privately, assuming they will not become public for many decades. On 
the other hand, they may not, given limited time, interest, or introspection. To reject a theory 
based on the lack of such documentation requires us to assume a leader would generally record 
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his intentions, a problematic assumption that may bias results and bears further attention. That 
one can assume leaders are generally conscious of their own motives is also not clear. The theory 
requires only that leaders instinctively identify a connection between their words, deeds, and the 
repercussions of public perceptions, not that leaders intellectualize or enunciate this connection 
for others. If politicians lack introspection, or are short on candor, then we may err in assuming 
their confidences, or private musings, are accurate records of motive or design.25  
 Concerns about case selection also leave us unconvinced of the extent to which the 
research designs used by these studies are suitable. Trachtenberg and Snyder and Borghard use 
versions of a “most likely” case design.26 Although both projects claim to be looking for 
evidence of a causal mechanism, each uses a research design intended to test hypotheses 
regarding causal effects. The most likely design is intended to test whether X affects Y, rather 
than how X affects Y. Both papers aim to identify the cases in which one is most likely to 
observe leaders creating audience costs in order to send credible signals to other leaders. The 
logic of inference here is that a lack of support for the theory, even in those cases in which it is 
most likely to operate, provides strong evidence against the theory.  
 Both projects thus fail to test directly the key implication of Fearon’s theory. The 
dependent variable in each case is the extent to which audience costs matter in crises, and the 
implicit hypothesis is that the costs should play critical roles in crises that meet certain scope 
conditions. Both articles present evidence against this hypothesis. To the extent that we might 
accept the evidence on its own terms, following the logic of a most likely design we could infer 
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audience costs are no more likely to play a role in the types of crises the authors examine than in 
other crises. Evidence provided by Trachtenberg and Snyder and Borghard thus weighs against 
audience cost theory, but does not result from direct tests of Fearon’s argument, for two reasons. 
First, Fearon’s hypothesis is that democracies less often back down in crises and are better able 
to generate audience costs. Neither Trachtenberg nor Snyder and Borghard test this hypothesis, 
focusing instead on whether audience costs are more likely to be used in certain types of crises. 
Second, Fearon argues that the creation of audience costs is a mechanism that allows leaders to 
send more credible signals during a crisis. Neither Trachtenberg nor Snyder and Borghard 
provide evidence that would lead us to believe leaders cannot use audience costs in this way.  
<A>THE MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF AUDIENCE COSTS</A> 
Causal mechanisms are difficult to test. This seems to be especially true with audience costs, in 
part because actors have strategic incentives to hide or misinterpret their intentions. Although the 
analysis of crisis behavior —through case studies or statistical analysis— can be used to shed 
light on the debate, finding conclusive evidence for or against audience cost theory may prove 
elusive. As with other formal models, the theory could be tested by careful specification of 
comparative statics combined with empirical work. We also encourage scholars to focus on 
testing the theory where it is arguably weakest: in its micro-foundations. Within the limited 
space here, we identify a foundation that deserves particular attention: the availability of 
information to the domestic public.  
 The theory assumes the public has sufficient information regarding crisis behavior, 
including, crucially, information that can be manipulated by leaders seeking to create audience 
costs. This is a very strong assumption and one that is empirically uncertain. Indeed, if we are to 
observe the audience costs mechanism in action, we are most likely to do so through the process 
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of leaders communicating with their publics. The key issue here can be summed up in the 
following question: Do publics have sufficient information regarding crisis behavior, even when 
leaders seek to signal to other states by creating audience costs?  
 There are several reasons to think domestic audiences may not be as well informed as the 
theory requires. First, the public is not generally knowledgeable about politics, especially about 
foreign policy.27 The public may overcome this problem by using “information shortcuts,” but 
how or whether leaders can create audience costs in light of these shortcuts is not clear.28 
Second, understandings of political communication have been questioned by recent advances in 
cognitive science. It may no longer be safe to pretend publics can process signals in the ways 
assumed by audience cost theory. Finally, if we assume the media are effective and unbiased 
conduits of information, then we might readily observe audience costs in the making in media 
content. Such an assumption is theoretically and empirically tenuous, however, given that the 
role of the media in this process is unclear.29 If the media fail to convey information to publics, 
then the ability of leaders to use the audience costs mechanism will be limited.30 Just as 
importantly, if the media are ineffective in the role of mobilizing public attention to leader 
commitments, then looking for audience costs by analyzing media reports will lead to biased 
conclusions about whether leaders actually use audience costs. 
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 We echo Potter and Baum in encouraging scholars to continue to refine the links between 
the crisis bargaining literature and the political communications literature.31 We hope by doing 
so scholars will be better equipped to understand the information system in crisis bargaining, an 
understanding that is crucial in determining whether and how audience costs mechanisms work. 
Experiments will be particularly useful in evaluating information transmission, an approach that 
has been pursued by several scholars.32 Although experiments face questions of external validity, 
this type of micro-level evidence can serve as an important complement to work studying crisis 
behavior directly.  
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